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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MELVYN BIRCOLL and JANINE
BIRCOLL, individuals,

Plaintiffs/Appellants
Appellate Case No. 20090179
vs.

SOUTHWEST MARBLE & GRANITE,
INC., a Utah corporation, et. al.
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RESPONSE BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE TRIAL COURT, JUDGE LUDLOW
and
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Shawn Ferris, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees
2107 W. Sunset Blvd., 2nd Floor
St. George, UT 84770

Mel Bircoll
Pro se Plaintiff/Appellant
2700 Casiano Road
Los Angeles, CA 90077

Please note that I am pursuins this appeal pro se for financial reasons.
As a layperson, I ask you to please excuse the form of this response brief.
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ARGUMENT

Without conceding the points in the Brief of Appellee not specifically
addressed herein, I offer the following in response to the Brief of Appellee:

(1) Abuse of Discretion. With due respect to the trial court, we believe
that it was an abuse of discretion to mechanically reduce attorneys' fees by
seventy-five percent (75%) for the following reasons:
(A)

The "non-compensable" contract claims are indispensable to the
compensable mechanic's lien claim on which we prevailed;

(B)

There was significant overlap among all claims;

(C)

The total amount of attorney's fees we requested was reasonable
and in no event burdensome to Southwest, which itself precipitated
the need for litigation to trial by wrongfully placing and refusing to
remove the lien on our home; and

(D)

The disparity between the fees we requested ($17,243.50) and the
principal recovery ($3,747) was a function of the current rate for
legal fees in the community, and in no event a result of wasteful
billing on the part of our trial attorney.

Moreover, we believe it was an abuse of discretion to disregard the public
policy implications of the award, to wit: the effective denial of access to the
Utah courts in all cases where the amount in controversy is low, and the
encouragement of reckless lien practices. Despite the high standard of
review, we trust the Utah Court of Appeal will take an interest in these
matters.
(2) Pro Se. Appellee complains that our brief does not comply with Rule
24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Before preparing the Brief of
the Appellant, however, we were given permission by the Court clerk to
make a reasonable effort to follow the proper procedures. We did so in good
faith. In any event, as pro se appellants, we are asking the Court to look
beyond the form of our presentation to the substance of our arguments.

(3) Irrelevance of Southwest "Project File". Appellee's attempt to
distract the Court's attention with a claim that the countertops as installed
comported with notes in its internal files - notes nowhere signed or
acknowledged by me or my wife, nor seen by me or my wife until they were
produced in Discovery - is an insult to this Court's intelligence and to the
trial court's Findings. The trial court specifically found that "Defendant
failed to perform pursuant to the terms of this agreement because it installed
countertops in the bathroom that were 3A inch thick with a flat, polished
edge." (Record at 77, Paragraph 6 of Conclusions.)
(5) Irrelevance of Fact That Parties' Agreement was "Oral". While the
parties' agreement was oral (between me and my wife, on the one hand, and
Southwest representative Mark Burnett, on the other), that does not impair
its validity. Like Appellee's attempt to distract the Court's attention with
references to its internal "notes," Appellee's characterization of the parties'
agreement as an "[Oral] Contract," see Brief of Appellee, p. 8, should be
disregarded.
(6) Misstatement of Trial Court's Conclusion. Appellee states on page 4
of its Brief, "The Trial Court concluded that Appellee had not installed
countertops of the wrong thickness." (Emphasis added.) Perhaps this was a
typographical error. In fact, the trial court concluded as follows:
"Defendant failed to perform pursuant to the terms of this agreement
because it installed countertops in the bathroom that were % inch thick with
a flat, polished edge." (Record at 77, Paragraph 6 of Conclusions.)
(7) Apparent Inapplicability of Allen v. Friel. It appears from Appellee's
own description of the case that Allen v. Friel is not on point. In Allen, the
pro se appellant's procedural flaws (i.e., failure to follow the appellate rules,
failure to provide portions of the record central to the appeal) were
compounded by substantive flaws (i.e., pro se appellant failed to identify
flaws in the district court's order to be reversed, and failed to show that there
was not a reasonable basis in the record to support the district court's
holdings). In contrast, we believe we have identified flaws in the trial
court's order to be reversed (e.g., failure to consider important public policy
ramifications of the award and failure to consider that: (i) the "noncompensable" contract claims are indispensable to the compensable
mechanic's lien claim on which we prevailed, (ii) there was significant
overlap among all claims, (iii) the total amount of attorney's fees we
requested was reasonable and in no event burdensome to Southwest, which

itself precipitated the need for litigation to trial by wrongfully placing and
refusing to remove the lien on our home, and (iv) the disparity between the
fees we requested ($17,243.50) and the principal recovery ($3,747) was a
function of the current rate for legal fees in the community and not a result
of wasteful billing on the part of our trial attorney). For the same reasons,
we also believe we have shown that there was not a reasonable basis in the
record to support the district court's mechanical, seventy-five percent (75%)
reduction of attorney's fees. While we broadly concede our procedural
errors in this appeal, as pro se appellants, we are at a loss to correct them.
Notwithstanding this, we pray that this Court will evaluate and validate the
substance of our arguments.
In this connection, it is also not known by us whether the cases cited by
Appellant (i.e., Jolivet and Steagall) are about pro se appellants. If not, we
would suggest that they, too, are inapplicable.
(8) Mischaracterization of Appellants' "Refusal to Pay." On page 12 of
the Brief of Appellee, Appellee states "It was the refusal of the Appellants to
pay any potion of this billing related to the subject countertops that resulted
in the filing of the mechanic's lien and pursuit of collection." This statement
is misleading. In fact, Southwest performed a great deal of kitchen and tile
work in our home, and it was paid in full and on time for all of it, in an
amount approximating Seventeen Thousand Dollars ($17,000). Given that,
and the fact that Southwest representative Mark Burnett immediately
acknowledged Southwest's error, my wife and I were, and continue to be, at
a loss to understand why the owner of Southwest would not have even
returned our many telephone calls regarding the bathroom countertops
before filing the lien against our new home. Please recall, in this
connection, that the charge to us for the bathroom countertops was to have
been $2,000, a mere fraction of the $19,000 of work we had ordered for the
home, and that the cost to Southwest of the bathroom countertops was only
$800. (This latter piece of information was provided to us by Southwest
representative Mark Burnett.) In any event, we reached an agreement with
Mr. Burnett that we would keep the wrong countertops (which actually had a
negative value to us) for no charge (i.e., that Southwest would write its own
mistake off). In short, any implication of a "refusal to pay" on our part is
wholly wrong.
(9) Dispute Over Hours Must Be Viewed in Larger Context: Appellee
quibbles with the number of hours spent by our attorney in bringing this

,ii«iter to trial. We believe that this quibbling must be evaluated in terms of
the big picture. To wit, is Seventeen Thousand Dollars ($17,000) for any
litigation to trial and judgment unreasonable? The answer must certain!} be
illI As Your Honors know, litigation over a $2,000 countertop costs the
same as litigation over a $20,000 countertop or a $200,000 countertop \ d
in the instant case, we had no choice but to litigate to trial because
Southwest refused to remove the lien from our home In am event, the
$17,000 was billed by our attorney, and paid by a ; ^ood faith, and even
Judge Ludlow said the amount was reasonable. Thus, the result of the ii:a.
court's mechanical reduction of those fees by 7*% ;r tl\\i \w litigants with
a relatively small amount in controversy - are effectively punished for
pursuing our contract and real property rights. This must surely be contrary
to Utah public policy, and an injustice to i is personally.
(10) Misrepresentation of Disparity Between Attorney's Fees and Amount
in Controversy, Disturbingly, Appellee misrepresents the disparity between
the total amount of Appellants' attorney's fees and the amount in
controversy. See Brief of Appellee, page 8 ("Appellants made a claim for
attorney's fees which exceeds the amount of recovery by more than
1100%."). In fact, the cost of the countertops plus the cost of replacement
(both of which costs were awarded to Appellant on the breach of com rat*
claim) totals $3,747, making the ratio of attorney's fees to costs miire like
460%. But even this number must be viewed in terms of the larger context:
If we are serious about affording litigants the right to protect their contract
and real property rights in court, then we must accept that in cases where the
amount in controversy is low but a litigant's contract and real property
rights are nonetheless wrongfully jeopardized— there will be a disparity
between attorney's fees and the amount in controversy. As long as the
attorney's fees are reasonable in the community, and the trial court
acknowledged that they were, the disparity should not be a bar to full
recovery of attorney's fees for the prevailing party.
{i i j Unfairness oi iviechanical Reduction. As laypeople, my wife and I are
at a loss to understand how we prevailed on the underlying breach of
contract claim and yet not on the abuse of lien claim: If (as the trial court
found) Southwest did not give us the benefit of our bargain and we ow ed
them nothing, then why was it not abusive for Southwest to place a lien on
our home? More to the point of this appeal, why are we forced to bear 75%
of our attorney's fees when we owed Southwest nothing for installing the
wrong bathroom countertops? The mechanical reduction of attorney's fees

by 75% would be understandable if the three other claims in this action were
unrelated (e.g., breach of contract and trespass). But in actuality, all claims
in the action are irrevocably intertwined. Inexplicably, the trial court
acknowledged this, but went on to find that "26.35 hours [1/4 of attorney
fees actually billed and paid for] is a fair and reasonable amount of time to
have spent on the mechanic's lien claim and [that] an award for that time
adequately vindicates plaintiffs rights under the statute."
\ due respect
to the trial court, we believe it was an abuse of discretion for the court not to
have considered that our prevailing on the mechanic's lien claim was
contingent on our winning the breach of contract issue. Given that one
claim was contingent on the other, how can our request for fees for the
remaining 75% of our attorney's work be denied consistent with equity and
Utah public policy?
(12) Designation of Appellant. Appellee characterizes as - j-'.^h/'u.u uu
fact that I isked to be addressed as "Dr. Bircoll" during the triai proceedings
: ui introduced myself as "Mel" in our telephone mediation. See Brief of
Appellee, p. 9t This is neither posturing nor inconsistent: I introduce myself
by my first name in informal settings but as a retired medical doctor, do ask
to be addressed by my correct title in more formal proceedings. I ask the
Court to ignore Appellant's personal attack against me and against my status
as a,pro se appellant in this action.

Thank you for your consideration.

Respectfully submitted

Mel Bircoll, M.D.

